Oct. 1, 2022

The Use of Emerging Disruptive Technologies by the Russian Armed Forces in the Ukrainian War

Langley AFB, VA — The Russian Ministry of Defence, on 18 March 2022, reported that Russian forces had used Kinzhal hypersonic missiles and destroyed an underground depot for missiles and aviation ammunition in the village of Delyatina in Western Ukraine. US officials also confirmed the use of hypersonic missiles . According to US officials, the launch aimed to test weapons and send a message to the West about Russia's military capabilities. This article discusses available Russian hypersonic missiles and reviews other Russian military capabilities used in military operations in Ukraine that potentially use emerging disruptive technologies.

May 1, 2022

Army Airspace Management During Large-Scale Combat Operations

The Air Defense Airspace Management/Brigade Aviation Element (ADAM/BAE) is a critical combat multiplier for Army brigade formations during large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Airspace is a finite resource which is under the purview of the joint commander, yet the number of airspace users utilized in the brigade area of operations continues to grow at an exponential rate. The ADAM/BAE remains uniquely situated to provide airspace management of the growing number of airspace users required for success against a peer competitor in LSCO.

April 25, 2022

Kill Box Update 2022

In the fall of 2008, members of the inaugural and second MTTP Kill Box joint working groups published an article called, “Kill Box Update,” in the Air Land Sea Bulletin. Large changes in MTTP Kill Box and the need to consolidate information and decisions generated from a joint staff joint fires area test motivated the authors to publish an update to the field. History repeats itself, and again, 13 years later, another kill box update is necessary to educate the joint force on the results of a joint test affecting the development of MTTP Kill Box.

March 31, 2022

Maneuver, Modernization, and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War

Eastern and Western perceptions of military affairs surface in the region of South Caucasus, a historic crossroad of multiple cultures and worrying parties and erupted into a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020 over a region called Nagorno-Karabakh, the mountainous enclave between two countries for which both nations maintain their cultural, national, and strategic claims. Prolonged military build-ups, defense coalition initiatives and military modernization are the backdrops for what is now called the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Feb. 28, 2022

Command, Control, and Communications in the Southwest Pacific Area Campaign (1943-45): A retrospective to inform future C2 and Competition in the Indo-Pacific

The current DoD and Indo-Pacific strategy calls for a dynamic forward posture and presence in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania (formerly the SWPA). While the communication challenges and operating environment remain largely unchanged, advanced 21st-century communication technologies will only be as effective as the sophisticated adversarial threat capabilities built to deny them. This retrospective intends to provide context for command and control, and communications for future competition and conflict (if required) in the South Pacific to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Feb. 15, 2022

Maneuver Combat and the Integration of Air Force Special Warfare: Leveraging TACP Expertise Against a Near-Peer Threat

TACPs can longer rest on their laurels of liaison and terminal control alone, they must acknowledge the struggles that our nation faces in the next conflict. The Air Force developed a map for the TACP weapon system in the latest AIR FORCE SPECIAL WARFARE (AFSPECWAR) TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY (TACP) WEAPON SYSTEM VISION 2030. In this four-page document, the USAF Deputy Chief of Staff states that: “The TACP weapon system (WS) is not currently postured to provide ‘joint lethality in contested environments’… from the tactical to strategic planning level as laid out in the National Defense Strategy …the improved TACP WS will provide effective air-minded integration to joint elements to enable stand-in sensors, link stand-off shooters, and provide all domain effects for joint commanders.” This battle-hardened community of joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) must evolve to be joint partners in all domains; kinetic and non-kinetic subject matter experts across the all-domain spectrum.

Jan. 1, 2022

DOD Cyberspace: Establishing a Shared Understanding and How to Protect It

The full consequences of potential adversary cyberspace operations (CO) in the DOD are still being fully understood. Yet, there is a lack of shared understanding about cyberspace across the DOD and the joint force and even less understanding of how the DOD should protect its cyberspace. Despite a desire to understand cyberspace and to protect ourselves, a dearth of clear, concise guidance for the joint force has led to a lack of emphasis on cyberspace and cyberspace security in planning and operations. This article establishes a clear, shared understanding of DOD cyberspace, provides guidance to the DOD to protect its cyberspace, and illustrates current and future efforts to improve DOD’s cybersecurity.