

ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE

JFLCC



**JOINT FORCES
LAND COMPONENT
COMMANDER**

STUDY

**AIR LAND SEA
APPLICATION
CENTER**

APRIL 1997

JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFLCC)

STUDY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Provides the purpose and background of the study.
- Provides doctrinal background for the joint force land component commander (JFLCC).
- Provides a review of JFLCC as practiced by operating forces and studied in schools.
- Provides factors to consider before employing the JFLCC option.
- Provides functions to be performed and responsibilities of the JFLCC.
- Provides options for a JFLCC headquarters.
- Concludes that procedures are available for combatant command (COCOM) employment of a JFLCC; procedures for joint task force (JTF) level JFLCC are not well developed, and a stand-alone publication for JFLCC operations is not desired.

PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

The purpose of this paper is to respond to a request by United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine and endorsed by the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center Joint Actions Steering Committee (JASC) to produce a study of JFLCC operations to specifically address—

- Factors that should be considered before employing the JFLCC option.
- Functions a JFLCC headquarters must perform.
- Options in establishing a JFLCC headquarters.

ALSA reviewed doctrine, interviewed Third Army officers, observed JFLCC operations, and ultimately formed a working group made up of soldiers and marines with interest in JFLCC operations to address the above issues.

DISCUSSION

This study reviews joint doctrine (current and proposed) and service doctrine relative to JFLCC. It identifies JFLCC operations in two unified commands (United States Central Command [USCENTCOM] and United States Atlantic Command [USACOM]), JFLCC analyses, and published research papers. Presented are factors to consider before employment of the JFLCC option, functions a JFLCC headquarters should perform, and options for a JFLCC headquarters as developed by the joint working group. The study concludes the following:

- Procedures are available and being practiced for the employment of a JFLCC.
- Procedures for JTF level JFLCC operations are not well-developed.
- A stand-alone doctrinal publication for JFLCC operations is not desired.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Do not initiate a stand-alone doctrinal publication for JFLCC operations.
- Expand JFLCC discussion in Joint Publications 3-56 and 5-00.2.
- Develop a Master Training Guide (MTG) for JFLCC operations using USACOM UNIFIED ENDEAVOR Exercises as a vehicle.

JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFLCC)

Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC)

The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as they may be assigned. The JFLCC is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The JFLCC will normally be the commander with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities.

Joint Publication 1-02

BACKGROUND

Problem

Command relationship has been established in joint doctrine for many years. One of the command options available to the combatant commander is the establishment of functional component commands. With the exception of the joint force air component commander (JFACC), joint doctrine for functional component command has not been fully developed. This lack of joint guidance has created ambiguity among the unified commands.

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) has retained joint force land component commander (JFLCC) functions with plans to hand over day-to-day JFLCC functions to a Deputy JFLCC (DJFLCC) - Marine Forces Central Command (MARCENT) or, likely, Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT). In anticipation of their DJFLCC role, Third US Army sought Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command's (HQ TRADOC's) support in defining the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the JFLCC. As a result, during Spring 1994 TRADOC proposed the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center conduct a feasibility study to determine the requirement for a JFLCC publication, and if required, the best vehicle to accomplish the requirement (a new publication or expanded scope of the Army Marine Corps Integration (AMCI) project). At the September 1994 meeting of the Joint Actions Steering Committee (JASC), ALSA concluded because of the level of operations, JFLCC was beyond the scope of the AMCI publication and before JFLCC could be expanded in any publication, the scope of authority and responsibility of the JFLCC must be defined. The JASC vetoed the proposed project. ARCENT continued to work the issue as USCENTCOM prepared for ROVING SANDS and BLUE FLAG 95. ARCENT and MARCENT put together a DJFLCC concept paper and drafted a DJFLCC Headquarters Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). During November 1995, HQ TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine again proposed ALSA develop a concept for JFLCC operations to specifically address —factors that should be considered before exercising the

JFLCC option; functions a JFLCC headquarters must perform; and the options in establishing a JFLCC headquarters.

After much staff work between Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and TRADOC, on 1 May 1996 the JASC gave verbal approval to pursue the topic in a form to be determined. In anticipation of a JASC assignment, ALSA observed JFLCC operations during three exercises, interviewed a number of Army and Marine personnel, and met with United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) and USCENTCOM officers concerning JFLCC. Relatively speaking, those officers aware of or currently dealing with JFLCC issues are small in number. Though exposure brings more willingness, wariness of the JFLCC concept still exists in many quarters. Virtually all staff officers interviewed expressed a desire for guidance for JFLCC operations beyond that provided in joint doctrine. Many of those interviewed were reluctant to see a standardized solution to arranging command relationships—saying whatever is produced should not be prescriptive; it should provide options for consideration rather than directions.

Based on observations, ALSA prepared a staff study concluding that sufficient JFLCC had not been conducted to derive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), but it would be beneficial for prospective joint task force (JTF) and JFLCC commanders to have a “menu” of options to assist in organizing and operating a JFLCC. A new study that addressed TRADOC’s issues, fleshed out service perspectives, and provided options for JTF commanders to consider in determining command relationships would best serve the warfighter. The JASC concurred with ALSA’s conclusions and gave approval for a study scoped to the issues identified by the TRADOC proposal; factors to consider before employment, functions a JFLCC must perform, and options for a JFLCC headquarters.

Research

ALSA began this study by reviewing joint and service specific documents concerning JFLCC and interviewing service representatives with responsibility for developing doctrine. It was decided to address the issues by forming a working group made up of soldiers and marines who have been exposed to JFLCC. This group was also asked to address a list of JFLCC questions/issues; a summary of the responses is at Appendix C. ALSA observed the following exercises:

- **PRAIRIE WARRIOR 96**, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas: A capstone exercise for the Army’s Command and General Staff College. This exercise employed combined forces land component commander (CFLCC) as coalition forces were used in addition to United States Army and Marine Corps forces (ARFOR and MARFOR). The CFLCC actual, also the exercise scenario scripter, found guidance for such operations lacking and though aware of the DJFLCC Headquarters SOP it was not used. Instead, guidance was taken from Army Field Manual 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*.
- **CJTFFEX 96 (PURPLE STAR)**, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina: A large scale, scripted joint/combined field training exercise concentrating on tactical interoperability where II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Forward (FWD) was designated JFLCC with JFLCC transitioning to XVIII ABC during a latter phase of the exercise. MARFOR and ARFOR staffers said the scenario did not warrant a JFLCC; it was an artificiality imposed upon the exercise. Staffers sought options for forming the JFLCC but desired guidance short of that presented in CENTCOM’s DJFLCC Headquarters SOP.

- **UNIFIED ENDEAVOR 96-2 (UE 96-2):** A USACOM sponsored exercise with II MEF as JFLCC and II MEF (FWD) and 4th BCT (III Corps) forming the land component. The JFLCC chief of staff for this exercise said JFLCC was more viable here than during PURPLE STAR and the option certainly has merit in some though not all circumstances. Also the JFLCC chief of staff would like to see JFLCC developed in a concept piece — keeping it broad, providing a list of options for the commander to consider, rather than doctrine or TTP that might tend to tie one’s hands. During this exercise, JFLCC was analyzed by a team commissioned by USACOM J-72 to assess the formation, organization, and operation of the JFLCC. The analysis team was tasked with the following:
 - Record observations and lessons learned on the JFLCC as executed during this unified endeavor.
 - Identify JFLCC problems experienced, the impact on operations, and steps taken to resolve them
 - Assess the operational benefits and costs in executing the JFLCC option.

JFLCC in Joint and Service Doctrine

JFLCC operations are not well documented in joint doctrine. Document searches of Joint, Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force doctrine mention JFLCC only 29 times (14 Joint/14 Army/ 0 Marine/1 Air Force). Many are duplicate entries. There are no joint staff or service “white papers” on the topic.

Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, codified functional componentcy. It states combatant commanders may exercise combatant command through service component commanders; functional component commanders, if established for a particular purpose; commander of a subordinate unified; commander of a JTF; single service force commander; or directly over specific operational forces. Chapter II describes functional componentcy:

- *Joint force commander’s (JFCs) may establish functional components to provide centralized direction and control of certain functions and types of operations...when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of command and effort are primary considerations.*
- *Functional componentcy can be appropriate when forces from two or more services operate in the same dimension or medium. Functional component staffs should be joint....and require advanced planning for efficient operations.*
- *The nature of operations, mix of service forces, and command and control (C2) capabilities are normally primary factors in selecting the functional component commander.*

Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, describes functional component commands and the authority of the JFC to designate a functional component commander and assign the responsibilities and authority in Chapter IV, Doctrine and Policy for Joint

Commands. Joint Publication 0-2 states—

The JFC establishing a functional command has the authority to designate its commander.

The responsibilities and authority of a functional component command must be assigned by the establishing JFC.

The JFC must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking and the relationships the functional component commander will exercise.

The functional component commander is responsible for making recommendations to the establishing commander on the proper employment of the military capability made available.

The functional component commander will normally be a service component commander.

The functional component commander's staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command...the number of personnel on this staff should be kept to the minimum and should be consistent with the task performed.

Neither publication speaks directly to JFLCC operations other than reflecting the definition found in Joint Publication 1-02 or depicting JFLCC on a wire diagram.

The current draft version (December 1996) of Joint Publication 3-56, *Command and Control*, addresses JFLCC as follows:

“The JFC may designate the Army component commander or the Marine Corps component commander as JFLCC. The designation of a JFLCC is normally done when the scope and complexity of land operations exceed the span of the JFC and the joint force staff or if the JFC is unfamiliar with land operations. Designation of a JFLCC may be appropriate when the scope of land operations will cover a large area, includes large numbers of multi-Service land forces; consists of numerous small widely dispersed areas of operations, requires close integration of combat support forces or capabilities, or requires overarching supervision of logistics and support operations to land forces. Normally, if land operations are limited in scope and size, the Service representing the preponderant land force will be assigned responsibility for the land operations and forces of other Services will be placed OPCON or TACON to the senior Service commander.”

Joint Publication 5-00.2, *Procedures for Forming and Operating a Joint Task Force*, preliminary coordination draft, 19 March 1996, adds to the discussion in the Joint Publications above by providing a list of JFLCC responsibilities that include—

- Advising the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on the proper employment of all land forces under control of the JFLCC.
- Planning and coordinating land operations and employing designated land forces in support of the CJTF's concept of operations.
- Issuing planning guidance.
- Analyzing various courses of action.
- Coordinating with the other joint task force component commanders and subordinate task forces to ensure the most efficient support is provided to the CJTF.
- Evaluating the results of land operations.
- Focusing on operational-level functions and their span of control.
- Functioning as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the CJTF.

- Establishing combat identification SOP and other directives based on CJTF guidance.

Service doctrine relative to JFLCC is limited to brief references in Army publications and nonexistent in Marine Corps doctrine. Army FMs 100-5, *Operations*, and 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*, briefly reflect the combatant commander could designate the senior commander of Army combat and support forces as the JFLCC. The combatant commander could then place other land forces (US Marines or allies) under operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of the JFLCC. Likewise, ARFOR could be placed under a JFLCC who is a Marine.

Colonel Caldwell (USAF retired), in his 1984 book, *Command Structure for Theater Warfare, The Quest for Unity of Command*¹, provides a comparative analysis of service doctrine relative to theater command structure. Much of that discussion remains true today; the Marine Corps remains structured to support the concept of an integrated Marine air-ground team in support of theater objectives. What differs from his presentation is today the Marine Corps is agreeable to operating as or for a functional component as necessary. The Marines believe the decision to use service or functional component or a combination thereof should be driven by the course of action for accomplishing the assigned mission. If the course of action calls for ARFOR and MARFOR to operate in geographical proximity to accomplish the mission, then a functional command structure for that mission may be appropriate.

JFLCC IN THE FIELD AND SCHOOLHOUSE

USCENTCOM

As mentioned earlier, USCENTCOM retains JFLCC functions and turns over day-to-day JFLCC activities to a DJFLCC. Third Army answered the questions it asked of TRADOC by developing an ARCENT/MARCENT DJFLCC Concept Paper and DJFLCC Headquarters SOP that have been fully staffed, prepared, and exercised. The following extraction is from the ARCENT/MARCENT Concept Paper implementing the duties as the DJFLCC:

“CINCCENT has defined the DJFLCC as a commander responsible for making recommendations on the proper employment of forces regarding organization for combat, priorities of effort (main effort), and designation of phase lines. The DJFLCC will devise the ground scheme of maneuver to support the campaign plan, prepare and shape the battlefield, coordinate and integrate operational reconnaissance, and conduct joint training of forces. In essence, planning and coordinating land operations or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. As the DJFLCC will normally be the commander with preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities, COMUSARCENT has been so designated although Commanding General I MEF has a “be prepared” mission as the JFLCC.

The role of the DJFLCC is both as an advisor to the commander of a combatant command (CINC)/JFC/JFLCC in respect to the conduct of integrated joint/multinational land operations in support of the campaign and as the executor of approved land operations. The authority and responsibilities specified by the CINC (JFLCC) enable the DJFLCC to control the day-to-day operations associated with conducting the approved land operation. For example, once a land force plan is approved by the CINC (JFLCC), the command and control of the operation resides

¹ Cardwell, T.A., *Command Structure for Theater Warfare, The Quest for Unity of Command* (Air U. Press, 1984)

largely at the DJFLCC's headquarters. This would mean that subsequent branches of planning necessary to ensure the success of the approved land force plan are developed and approved by the DJFLCC."

The following operational tasks constitute the predominate focus of the DJFLCC for CENTCOM:

- **Operational Movement and Maneuver.** The DJFLCC has responsibility for operational movement and maneuver to create a decisive impact on the conduct of the CINC's campaign once the CINC approves the land force plan. The DJFLCC has been specifically tasked by the CINC (JFLCC) to—make recommendations on the employment of forces that include organizing for combat, integrating coalition land forces in the land fight, developing a land force scheme of maneuver to support the CINC's campaign plan, establishing priorities of effort (main effort), designating the fire support coordination line (FSCL) and internal boundaries, and coordinating/integrating/synchronizing operational reconnaissance and operational fires that impact maneuver.
- **Operational Firepower.** The DJFLCC has responsibility for the planning and employment of operational firepower in terms of developing an integrated multidimensional/multimediuum attack of the enemy's center of gravity and in terms of shaping the land forces' future battlefield.
- **Operational Protection.** The DJFLCC significantly influences all land forces' activities dealing with the conservation of the force or preserving the fighting potential of joint/multinational land forces so that they can be applied at the decisive time and place.
- **Operational Command and Control (Battle Command).** The DJFLCC has significant responsibility for operational C2. The DJFCC becomes the single focal point for integrated, synchronized, multinational/multiservice land force operations or primary land force warfighter.
- **Operational Intelligence.** Whereas the DJFLCC becomes the focal point for land force operations, a significant responsibility associated with this is focusing intelligence efforts that lead to the identification and location of the enemy's center of gravity (or high-payoff targets affecting the center of gravity) if successfully attacked will achieve the land forces' assigned mission. At the operational level of war, all major tactical combat formations share access to the joint intelligence architecture. The DJFLCC may have to become involved in the prioritization of land force intelligence taskings for surveillance and reconnaissance. Additionally, the DJFLCC has the responsibility for the identification and location of enemy center(s) of gravity that could be successfully attacked by land forces.
- **Operational Support.** The responsibility for sustainment for joint/multinational land forces lies primarily with its parent service or is provided through national sources. The DJFLCC would make recommendations concerning the distribution of materiel and services commensurate with priorities derived from land force operations.

Commander, United States Army Forces, Central Command (COMUSARCENT) has the authority to exercise OPCON over US Army ground forces and civil affairs forces. COMUSARCENT exercises command less OPCON of psychological operations (PSYOP) forces. COMUSARCENT, as the DJFLCC, will also exercise TACON of US Marine ground

forces (this includes the air wing that is "organic" to ground forces in a manner similar to Army aviation) and US ground forces passing through or occupying terrain in the theater joint rear area (geographically not specified). Third Army has completed a revision of their DJFLCC Headquarters SOP.

USACOM

JFLCC has been employed during USACOM's UNIFIED ENDEAVOR exercise series. During the academic phase of the exercise, JFLCC is briefed as an option for the CJTF. USACOM instructors/trainers present a brief that covers authority to form functional components (as described in Joint Publication 3-0), the JFC's considerations in determining command relations (mission, duration of operation, force capabilities, C2, centralize selected functions), JFLCC responsibilities and functions (plans and executes land operations, integrates and coordinates fire and maneuver of land forces, synchronizes interdiction, coordinates support from other components, retains service component commander responsibilities/C2, support, intelligence, protection, firepower, movement and maneuver), JFLCC organization (J1-6 with personal and special staffs), and the pros (unity of command, unity of effort, centralized planning, simplifies tasking) and cons (additional headquarters, additional staffing, unclear command relationships) of employing a JFLCC.

During preparation for UE 96-2, the CJTF employed a JFLCC to control land operations. Because of the limited information available about JFLCC operations, USACOM J-72 commissioned an analysis to be conducted by Mr. Bruce Freeland and Captain Schwaiger from HQ TRADOC and assisted by Marines from MCCDC and the Armed Forces Staff College. This team was tasked with—

- Recording observations and lessons learned on the formation, organization, and operation of the JFLCC during UE 96-2.
- Addressing specific issues raised with respect to JFLCC operations.
- Identifying JFLCC problems, impact, and steps taken to solve them.
- Assessing the advantages and disadvantages in executing the JFLCC option.

Following are advantages and disadvantages of the JFLCC option as observed by the team during UE 96-2:

Advantages

- The JFLCC provides an invaluable ability to have consolidated picture of land force capabilities, when the JTF is an ad hoc staff just coming together.
- The JFLCC allows for a single battle concept and focus of effort. The JFLCC allows concentration and synergistic effect of warfighting capabilities.
- The JFLCC allows for more efficient and synchronized planning and allows for early deconfliction of competing land force requirements.
- The JFLCC can provide a coordinated and deconflicted OPORD and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) to the JTF.
- The JFLCC can ease logistics coordination.

- The JFLCC provides a single representative to the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) who not only represents the ARFOR and MARFOR but also carries more weight by providing a single, coordinated position for the land components.
- A JFLCC can be implemented by dual-hatting a service staff with JFLCC

responsibilities.

Disadvantages

- The JFLCC presents considerable additional staffing requirements.
- The JFLCC can create another layer of staff (except when the ARFOR and MARFOR are embedded in the JFLCC).
- Absence of joint doctrine on the operation of the JFLCC and differences between services can result in problems with conflicting SOPs and terms of reference.
- Service tends to lose its ability to directly address the CJTF.
- There is limited guidance available on the JFLCC concept.
- Effectiveness of the JFLCC is highly dependent on the situation and on the personalities of key leaders.
- The JFLCC option is not appropriate for many situations, particularly military operations other than war (MOOTW) update.
- Start-up orientation is needed for each service to learn how the other works.

The UE 96-2 JFLCC analysis team concluded—

Current joint doctrine does not provide sufficient detailed guidance for executing the JFLCC option. There is a need to develop guidelines to assist in deciding when to stand up and when not to stand up a JFLCC. It would also be beneficial for the prospective JTF commander and JFLCC to have a menu of options to assist in organizing and operating a JFLCC.

The need for a JFLCC is situation dependent. In this instance (UE 96-2), the JFLCC concept was appropriate and well implemented. The scenario was tailored for standing up a JFLCC. Specifically, theater emphasis for the most part was on air and naval operations; the CJTF was not from a ground component service; and the area for ground operations was small resulting in very close integration of ARFOR and MAROR.

During UE 96-2 the JFLCC staff was organized like a "mini-JTF." This was partly because of a de facto staff structure forced on the JFLCC by the exercise manning document. It was the most common solution in the absence of doctrine or guidance on how the JFLCC should be formed and organized. While the organization worked well in this scenario, there is no guarantee it would be appropriate for other types of scenarios.

Through an integrated staff, the JFLCC can deconflict competing requirements and efficiently produce a coordinated OPLAN and TPFDD. The ability to resolve conflicts and present a coordinated position for the land components also extends to the JTCB and relations with the other functional components (joint force air component commander, joint force marine component commander [JFACC, JFMCC]).

The ARFOR or MARFOR will require substantial augmentation from the other services when assigned to be the JFLCC. Whether or not part of the cost of this augmentation could possibly come from some reduction in the size of the JTF staff should be the subject of further study.²

US Army Command and General Staff College

During recent PRAIRIE WARRIOR exercises at the Army's Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, JFLCC was employed, in one form or another. The scripter of the 1995 exercise, Lieutenant Colonel Myron J. Griswold, then a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, found guidance lacking and captured his research on the topic in his paper, "*JFLCC: The First Step.*" The purpose of his paper was to address the roles and responsibilities of a JFLCC in a theater of operations, functions a JFLCC headquarters must perform, and how an ARFOR headquarters should be organized to carry out the JFLCC functions. He concluded the role of the functional land component commander as outlined in Joint Publication 3-0 is viable and in a complex operational environment involving the employment of one or more Army corps and one or more MEF, the JFC is likely to assign responsibilities to the Army service component commander (ASCC). Further the ASCC has two options; assign support functions to another headquarters and perform JFLCC functions with the staff or bring in a numbered Army to control the conduct of operations. He wrote that the functions to be performed are found in the Universal Joint Task List as described above by USARCENT and provides a well-developed plan for the organization of the JFLCC staff built on a numbered Army staff.

Major Andrew S. Sandoy, USA, completed a monograph entitled *The Land Component Commander: Is One Required?* in 1990, while a student in the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. His very interesting monograph sought to answer the question: when does a theater of operations need a subordinate land component commander (LCC)? He sought the answer in four steps:

- Reviewing joint doctrine and highlighting conflict between it and Army doctrine.
- Studying management theory to understand organizational methods available.
- Surveying American theaters of operation (Central Europe, the Mediterranean, South East Asia, the Far East, and the Pacific) over the last 50 years for organizational trends.
- Analyzing these theater organizations against three criteria: objective, unity of command, and simplicity.

He concluded from his historical analysis that—(1) theaters transition from functionally based organizations at the start of war to area based organizations at the end of war, (2) theaters with a subordinate LCC have a single concentrated land objective, while vast theaters with dispersed objectives have an area based organization, and (3) a subordinate LCC addresses parochial service or national interests, while a strong CINC overcomes these.

Major Sandoy identified five considerations that favor the subordinate LCC in a mature theater:

² UE 96-2 Analysis, HQ TRADOC, DCSSA, September 1996

- The unexpected start of a war*
- Inexperienced leaders*
- Concentrated objective*
- A weak CINC*
- CINC with a different nationality or service from the land force.*³

US Army War College

At the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, JFLCC is presented as an option during Joint Operations exercises. Due to the paucity of available guidance, Colonel John A. Bonin, an instructor at the college, put together a JFLCC Primer that addresses JFLCC authority, selection, command relationships, responsibilities, operational functions, and interrelationships with sea and air components.

EMPLOYING THE JFLCC OPTION

This study was intended to address the three TRADOC issues on JFLCC operations: factors that should be considered before exercising the JFLCC option; functions a JFLCC headquarters must perform; and the options in establishing a JFLCC headquarters. A study of doctrine, observation of exercises, and review of DJFLCC procedures did not yield enough to address those issues. Ultimately it was decided to form a working group made up of Army and Marine Corps officers to attack these questions. The following reflects the best efforts of that group:

What Factors Should Be Considered Before Exercising The JFLCC Option?

The toughest decision for a JFC is how to organize for combat; establishing the chain of command and responsibility. Likewise, the group formed to discuss JFLCC issues had the greatest difficulty identifying the threshold that defines when a JFLCC is to be employed. Several options are available for organizing a force. Joint Publication 3-0 states—*The manner in which JFCs organize their forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint force operations. The first principle in joint force organization is that JFCs organize force to accomplish the mission based on the JFC’s vision and concept of operations. Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are key considerations. JFCs may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces.* JFCs can conduct operations through service components, functional components, or, most often, a combination of service and functional components with operational responsibilities.

Joint doctrine and the assembled JFLCC working group have identified a number of considerations for employing a JFLCC that can be summarized as follows:

- Mission.** *The mission requires the capabilities and functions of more than one service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of effort is a primary concern.* Geographical concentration, particularly when supporting fires from one service will affect another, is a primary reason for the direction of land efforts by a JFLCC. The landing at Normandy and the battle for Okinawa are two historical examples of a

³Major Sandoy, A.S., *The Land Component Commander: Is One Required?*, Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth KS, 1990

geographically concentrated objective under a single land commander. Dispersed objectives, different lines of communications, and support might better be addressed by another organizational option.

- Scope.** *Land forces assigned are large in number.* Most agree that a JFLCC would likely be employed when multiple Corps/MEFs are involved although no doctrinal guidance directs such. Short of that, most situations requiring Army/Marine Corps integration can be covered by the information provided in ALSA publication, *Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations (AMCI)*, FM 90-31, MCRP 3-3.8, May 1996. AMCI assumes two base cases to provide a framework for discussion. The cases focus on C2 of a notional Army brigade by a MEF and the C2 of a notional MEF (FWD) by an Army corps. The publication describes the four basic command relationships to facilitate C2 of the force; OPCON, TACON, support, and attachment.
- Duration.** *Duration of operations must validate the establishment of a single land force commander.* Costs in terms of personnel and staff training, C4 architecture, and impact on flexibility must be weighed against anticipated duration of operations.
- JFC Experience.** *The JFC may not have a background in land operations.* The multiple complex tasks confronting the JFC may exceed the JFC's span of control. The JFC may have other actions in the joint operating area requiring focus.
- C2 Capabilities.** *The C2 capabilities of the JFC are limited and extensive C2 of land components are anticipated.* The C2 capabilities of the potential JFLCC and interoperability with forces assigned must be considered.
- Coalition Warfare.** *If the CINC and the preponderant land force are of different nationalities, a JFLCC might be established to give the majority land force representation (General Montgomery for the Normandy landing).* Conversely, if that situation is to be avoided, the CINC may retain JFLCC as General Eisenhower did after Normandy and as is currently the case in CENTCOM.

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Brosk at USACOM J-72 proposes that JFLCC formation criteria be addressed using the life cycle of a JTF as discussed in DRAFT Joint Publication 5-00.2, Figure IX-3. This life cycle includes forming the JTF headquarters; planning; deployment; employment; transition; and redeployment. He notes the JFC could form a JFLCC for one or all phases of the life cycle or anywhere in between.

- Forming the JTF Headquarters.** If the headquarters forming the base of the joint force is primarily an Air Force or naval organization, formation of a JFLCC allows for the detailed planning, coordination, and execution of operations that may not be familiar to the joint force headquarters. In multinational operations in which the ground component is composed of a variety of national components, the formation of a JFLCC allows for the JFC to lessen the required span of control from national elements to functional elements.
- Planning.** If planning indicates that the combined efforts of ground capabilities will be required to achieve the desired end state, formation of a JFLCC may be warranted. These conditions may be the result of simultaneous or sequential operations. When there is no preponderant ground force or if the scale and criticality of the minority ground force is of such a level that its successful execution is essential to the overall operation then a JFLCC may provide for best utilization of ground force capabilities.

•**Deployment.** When ports of debarkation are limited or constrained, formation of a JFLCC may allow for prioritization of the arrival of ground capability that best supports the ground tactical plan.

•**Employment.** Consider the nature, sequencing, or simultaneity of the operation to determine when and where the ground components are mutually supporting. If this mutual support is the norm or critical to success, a JFLCC may be warranted. If ground forces will be competing for joint force assets at the same time, particularly those provided by the JFACC, the JFLCC may provide for prioritization and redirection of assets as the situation requires.

•**Transition.** Formation of a JFLCC may allow for a single point of contact for the JFC and the host nation to coordinate for support/execution.

•**Redeployment.** The JFLCC may ensure unity of effort and complete support to the redeploying forces.

Lieutenant Colonel Brosk states the guiding principle should be whether or not the JFLCC is the best C2 arrangement for each particular phase. He cautions that the C2 arrangement must be in place before the commencement of any particular phase so relationships and procedures are established before their actual need.

What Functions Must A JFLCC Headquarters Perform?

All agree the functions to be performed by the JFLCC and staff are those found in the Universal Joint Task List, MCM-147-93, and described earlier by USCENTCOM in its DJFLCC Concept Paper: operational movement and maneuver, operational firepower, operational protection, operational C2, operational intelligence, and operational support. The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the concept of operations. JFLCC responsibilities should include—

- Acting as the coherent land spokesman.⁴
- Advising the JFC on the employment of all land forces under the JFLCC's control.
- Focusing on operational level functions and their span of control.
- Issuing planning guidance.
- Planning, synchronizing, and executing land operations that support the operational objectives of the JFC.
- Coordinating with other functional and service components as necessary to prosecute land operations.
- Establishing C4I systems for executing land operations.
- Performing battlespace area evaluation.
- Coordinating and conducting JFLCC staff training, combat rehearsals, and recommend joint force training.
- Evaluating the results of land operations.
- Providing capabilities like the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) to enable deconfliction of airspace and target nominations, theater missile defense (TMD), and

⁴ Colonel Bonin, John A., Army War College, Phoncon, December 1996

other emerging functions based on the unique conditions of any campaign.

- Maintaining supported/supporting relationship with other components.
- Establishing combat identification standard operating procedures and other directives based on JFC guidance.
- Commanding and controlling of force deployment/redeployment.

The UE 96-2 analysis team observed that there is a void in doctrine, joint or otherwise, pertaining to the duties and responsibilities of the JFLCC during the period between designation as the JFLCC and the development of the JTF concept of operations. The analysis team interpreted this to mean the JFLCC has little or no role until a concept of operations is developed. The analysts surmised that the intent of Joint Publication 0-2 is the designated JFLCC would be the central figure to advise and make recommendations on the employment of land forces ensuring that unity of effort and focus is maintained during the planning period preceding selection of a course of action by the JFC, especially in time-sensitive planning. The analysis team said it is critical that this is done without usurping the authority of the service components in their responsibilities to advise the JFC on service peculiar matters. Important issues: how the JFLCC is designated and how the JFC conveys authority, duties, and responsibilities? The JFLCC will most likely be stood up when the JTF stands up and the designation of the JFLCC and the JFLCC authority should be conveyed in a published, directive format so all members of the command are clear as to the JFLCC's role and authority. It could be done in the JTF Warning Order or by a directive but should include a clear tasking with authority and responsibilities from the JFC.⁵

What Are The Options In Establishing A JFLCC Headquarters?

The JFLCC organizes the staff per the mission and forces assigned. While there is no standard JFLCC headquarters organization, a JFLCC headquarters will likely be formed from among the JFC's service component headquarters and sized according to mission. Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, states—*when a functional component will employ forces from more than one service, the functional component commander's staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command...The number of personnel on this staff should be kept to the minimum and should be consistent with the task performed.*

The standard joint architecture, including the commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, and joint staff should establish the baseline for the JFLCC staff. Observations during the UE 96-2, analysis points out augmentation should not be done “on the cheap” if the staff is to be effective—the staff must be joint and not simply one service staff leavened with liaison from another service. The USCENTCOM DJFLCC SOP calls for the USARCENT staff to be augmented by 128 marines if the ARFOR is to be the DJFLCC and in the other case 157 soldiers to augment the Marine staff. Options identified by the JFLCC working group for forming the JFLCC staff:

- Option A.** Form JFLCC staff separate from service component command headquarters. This includes deputy commander (different service than JFLCC), chief of staff, and full

⁵ UE 96-2 Analysis

J-staff (J1-J6). Option A is the most expensive in terms of personnel alone, is ad hoc, and adds a layer of command to the structure (Figure 1).

- **Option B.** Form JFLCC staff by augmenting service component command headquarters with staff from other service component(s). Full integration of augmentees within all staff elements. This includes full J staff (J1-J6) (Figure 1). Under Option B the designated commander will provide the core C2 elements of the JFLCC staff and each land force will provide key personnel to each staff section to assist in planning, coordination, and execution of JFLCC operations. In all instances the JFLCC and his deputy are from different services. The personal staff includes the sergeant major, chaplain, staff judge advocate, public affairs officer, etc. The special staff includes those representatives the JFLCC desired for advice on technical and operational matters. The notional joint land operations center developed by Lieutenant Colonel Griswold in his paper, includes six cells: battle staff command element (JFLCC, chief of staff, J-2, J-3), movement and maneuver (J-3 operations officers, intelligence analysts, unit liaison officers), firepower (J-3 and component targeting officers, J-3 air intel analysts), component liaison section (senior LNOs), support (J-1,4,6 or deputies), and protection (air defense, OPSEC, deception, PSYOP, etc.).⁶




Figure 1. Option A and B⁷

⁶Figure Extracted from Lieutenant Colonel Griswold, Myron J., JFLCC: The First Step, Research Paper, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth KS, June 1995, p25

⁷Ibid, p21

- Option C. Form JFLCC staff from service component command headquarters by staff from other service component(s). Under this option, the designated service component commander's staff/operational planning group (J-2, 3, and 5) is augmented to be made joint while liaison is established with the other staff sections (J-1,4, and 6) (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Option C

CONCLUSIONS

Despite the lack of detailed guidance, the role of the JFLCC as outlined in Joint Publications 3-0 and 0-2 is viable and being practiced, albeit to a limited degree, at the CINC/unified command and JTF levels. ARCENT has answered the JFLCC questions it asked of TRADOC. DJFLCC (in fact JFLCC) roles, responsibilities, functions, and staff options have been presented in the ARCENT/MARCENT DJFLCC Concept Paper and delineated in the DJFLCC Headquarters SOP. This SOP provides an excellent start for any combatant commander anticipating organizing for land combat on a functional basis.

For JTF level operations, current joint doctrine does not provide enough guidance for executing the JFLCC option. Additionally, the JFLCC option has not been employed with enough frequency to derive real TTP at this point. The working group assembled to discuss JFLCC concluded that a stand-alone doctrinal publication is unnecessary—expanded guidance in Joint Publications 3-56 and 5-00.2 would meet the need. What is desirable is a list of guidelines for organizing, training, and operating a JFLCC vice prescriptive doctrine. The group proposed that lessons learned from UNIFIED ENDEAVOR exercises might provide the best venue for the development of a Master Training Guide (MTG) for JFLCC Operations as described in Chapter One of the *Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide (JTFHQMTG)* produced by USACOM.

Employment of a JFLCC is an option for the JFC when determining how to organize for combat. Each situation should be taken on its own C2 merits. The JFC should not stand on pat answers to general requirements. The costs and benefits of the available organizational options must be weighed in each situation. “A decisive factor helps to make these tenuous,

complex, diverse arrangements function. This factor is the designated commander's personal assumption of responsibility for his mission."⁸

⁸ Cushman, J.H., *Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy* (AFCEA Intnat'l, Washington D.C., 1995), p76

Appendix A

JOINT DOCTRINE BACKGROUND

This outlines joint doctrine historical perspective on the organization of forces and command relationships.

In the first decade of this century the Secretaries of War and the Navy created the “Joint Board” to address matters requiring cooperation between the Army and Navy. The status quo at the time had been “mutual cooperation.” This board met irregularly until later years, but in 1910 the principle of mutual cooperation was modified to give the Navy command afloat up to the high water mark and the Army command ashore, including Navy and Marine Corps elements.⁹ “The doctrine could not, however, resolve serious conflicts when the separate service functions became entwined....A possible solution was to select a leader such as General Pershing, who would be placed in supreme command of all forces that might be assigned to an expeditionary force but would exercise that authority through subordinate level commanders. This was the principle of unity of command.”¹⁰ The first edition of the *Joint Actions of the Army and Navy (JAAN)* addressed operational coordination between the two services. The 1927 edition included discussion of service missions and identified three principles for coordination of armies and navies in pursuit of common objectives:

- Close Cooperation. When the mission would be accomplished by relatively independent action of the deployed forces.
- Limited Unity of Command. When it was determined that the objective fell within the “paramount interest” of one service and forces of the other were temporarily placed under the operational control of the service commander exercising paramount interest.
- Unity of Command. When the objective required the hierarchical subordination of all component forces under a single commander in those instances where such command was specifically authorized by the President.¹¹

The 1935 edition of the *JAAN* stated—

- Neither service will attempt to restrict in any way the means and the weapons used by the other service in carrying out its functions.
- Neither service will attempt to restrict in any way the area of operations of the other service in carrying out its functions.
- Each service will lend the utmost assistance possible to the other service in carrying out its functions.¹²

The National Security Act of 1947 created three military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and four services (establishing the Marine Corps and Air Force as separate services). It also created the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recognized the unified and specified

⁹ Beaumont, R.A., *Joint Military Operations, A Short* (Greenwood Press, 1993), p34

¹⁰ Allard, C.K., *Command, Control, and the Common Defense* (Yale University, 1990), p95

¹¹ Ibid p96

¹² Cushman, J.H., *Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy* (AFCEA International, Washington D.C., 1995), p52

command structure. This started the move toward centralized direction over the military that was capped off in the Reorganization Act of 1958 that took the military services out of the chain of command. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, 1959, a direct descendant of the *JAAF*, covers the changes resulting from the National Security Act and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.

The UNAAF of 1959 also delineated methods of exercising command and obtaining coordination. It stated a commander of a unified command may exercise command —

- Through service component commanders.
 - By establishing a subordinate unified command
 - By establishing a uni-service force reporting directly to the commander of the unified command.
 - Establishing a joint task force.
 - Attaching elements of one force to another.
-
- Through specific operational forces that, because of the mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the commander.

And by the commander of a specified command—

- Through the commander's appropriate subordinate commands.
- By establishing a joint task force.
- By establishing a uni-service force reporting directly to the commander of the specified command.
- Attaching elements of one force to another force.

The *UNAAF* went on to describe use of attached forces. The commander of the force should use the attached units for the purpose for which they were attached. He should not dissipate them by breaking them up for assignments to other tasks. Further, there should be appropriate representation on the staff of the common commander. In describing Support, the *UNAAF* stated the supporting commander prescribes the tactics, methods, and procedures to be employed by his forces.

Following operations in Grenada, much pressure was placed on reforming JCS. “The new spirit was evident in 1984, when an Air Force colonel, in proposing a unified command structure in any future theater operations, argued against the “focus on systems to fight a war and service orientation instead of the structure itself” and for the delegation of responsibility by functional area.”¹³ The Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed in May 1986 and the *UNAAF* of 1986 added a seventh and fifth method of exercising operational command for unified and specified commanders respectively: “through functional component commanders, if established for a particular operational purpose.”

In 1992 General Powell put out the paper “*A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts*” to serve as guidance to the lead agents of the various joint publications whose development required agreement on selected operational concepts. The paper starts the

¹³ Beaumont, p171

discussion of organizational concepts by saying: “The first principle in joint force organization is that joint force commanders organize forces to accomplish the mission based on their mission and concept of the operation. Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are key considerations. Joint force commanders may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of the subordinate forces.” Additionally, “functional componentcy can be appropriate when forces from two or more services must operate in the same dimension or medium. A joint force land component commander is one example.” General Powell goes on to say “joint force commanders should allow service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the joint force commander while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the service organizations.”¹⁴

¹⁴ General Powell, C.L., *A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts*

Appendix B

ARMY/MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS

Prior to World War II (WWII) the Army and Marine Corps operated together infrequently. Marines were in the vanguard during General Winfield Scott's storming of the Chapultepec Heights in 1847 ("From the halls of Montezuma...").¹⁵ During World War I (WWI) Marine Brigadier General John A. Lejeune was given command of the 2d Division of the American Expeditionary Force which included the 4th Marine Brigade then commanded by an Army officer. And early in 1941 the Army's 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division were placed under the command of Marine Major General H.M. Smith and his First Joint Training Force for an anticipated landing in the Azores.¹⁶ But not until late in the WWII Pacific campaign did Army/Marine integration of JFLCC magnitude take place.

During the war in the Pacific, the most notable instance of Army/Marine Corps integration was the battle for Okinawa. The operation was commanded by VADM Kelly Turner (TF 51). The Joint Expeditionary Force was commanded by Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner (TF 56, CG Tenth Army). Tenth Army consisted of an Army Corps (XXIV Corps-7th and 96th Divisions) and III Amphibious Corps (1st and 6th Marine Divisions) commanded by Major General Geiger. General Buckner requested a joint staff and was augmented by 30 Navy and Marine personnel each. During planning for the operation, General Buckner made known his desires concerning his succession of command, he felt that General Geiger was capable of handling a field Army. During the final push for Okinawa, General Buckner was killed while up forward observing Marine operations. Upon notification of the General's death, Admiral Turner gave command of Tenth Army to General Geiger until General Stilwell's arrival four days later (by that time Okinawa was won).

The hostilities in Korea in 1950 provided the first test of the National Security Act of 1947. General MacArthur, as theater commander, exercised command through Eighth Army, Commander, Naval Forces Far East, and Commander, Far East Air Force. For the landing at Inchon, X Corps was formed from the First Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division. Command of X Corps was given not to Lieutenant General Shepard, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, as recommended by General MacArthur's staff, but to his own Chief of Staff, Major General Almond. The Corps headquarters was a hastily assembled provisional staff made up of Army officers because CHROMITE was "definitely a land operation...once the landing was made."¹⁷ During the assault and until control was passed ashore, 1st Marine Division, as the landing force, came under the Attack Force Commander, Amphibious Group One. When Major General Almond assumed command of X Corps ashore, the Marine Division reverted to the Corps command.¹⁸

In 1958 an example of Army and Marine Forces ashore under a single land command took place. The President directed that US Forces deploy to Lebanon to support the Lebanese

¹⁵ Beaumont, p19

¹⁶ Ibid, p68

¹⁷ Heintz, R.D., *Victory at High Tide, The Seoul-Inchon Campaign* (Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of America, Annapolis, 1984), p54

¹⁸ Ibid, p52

government in maintaining internal control. Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) was made responsible for the Lebanon operation. The first units to arrive were US Marines of the Sixth Fleet and then Army units from throughout Europe. Ultimately 6000 Marines and 8500 soldiers were on the ground. In view of the size and complexity of the Lebanon operation, CINCNELM requested that a Major General or Lieutenant General, Marine or Army, be assigned to command the land forces as Commander, Army Marine Land Forces (COMAMLANFOR). The request was approved and COMAMLANFOR with a joint staff of Army and Marine personnel was charged with all joint aspects of land force operations and support planning in the middle east area and with assisting CINCNELM in maintaining liaison with Lebanese commanders.¹⁹

In 1965 another contingency resulted in a single land command of Army and Marine forces. The President ordered US forces to the Dominican Republic in response to a deteriorating political situation. Marines from the Caribbean Ready Amphibious group were first to arrive followed by units of the 82nd Airborne Division. A week later the CG XVIII ABC assumed command of Land Forces, Dominican Republic, consisting of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade commanded by a USMC Brigadier General and the 82nd Airborne Division commanded by an Army Major General.²⁰

In May 1965 III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) was established in Vietnam's I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ). In 1968 during the TET Offensive, COMUSMACV moved Army forces to the northern part of I CTZ to reinforce III MAF. COMUSMACV then activated a provisional Corps, Vietnam (PROVCORPSV) to provide operational direction of the expanded ground force structure. The Commanding General III MAF continued his current missions and exercised operational control of the PROVCORPSV. By summer 1968, PROVCORPSV was redesignated XXIV Corps and remained under the operational control of the Commanding General III MAF. During the drawdown of forces in I CTZ in 1969, the Marines were no longer the predominant service in the region and the relationship between III MAF and XXIV Corps reversed.²¹

During the Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf served as the CINC and ground commander. While he had an Army Component in 3d Army, he declined to place either the Marines or the Arab Coalition forces under it. General Schwarzkopf's main reason for retaining ground command was the same as reportedly exists in CENTCOM today, to avoid offending coalition sensitivities by having three star equivalents working for another three star.²² General Schwarzkopf did task the Third Army staff with the responsibility of developing the overall ground operations plan in conjunction with the Marines and Arab Coalition partners and the "Tiger" Brigade of the Army's 2d Armor Division was placed under the control of the 2nd

¹⁹ Cushman, pp 74/5

²⁰ Ibid, pp 75/6

²¹ Ibid, pp 61/2

²² Scales, R.H., *Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War* (Command and General Staff College Press, Leavenworth, 1994), p141

Marine Division. Lieutenant General Trainor, USMC Retired, argues in his *Joint Forces Quarterly* article (winter 93/94) that had Schwarzkopf centralized planning and execution under a single land commander, more control of the offensive during the 100-hour war might have been exercised and the Marine and VII Corps attacks would have been more effective if more closely coordinated.²³

²³ Trainor, B.E., Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War, *Joint Force Quarterly*, #3 (Winter 93/94)

Appendix C

JFLCC QUESTIONS ADDRESSED BY THE JFLCC JOINT WORKING GROUP

1. What operational advantage/value added is gained by employing the JFLCC option?

Advantages

- Single voice for land forces—consolidated picture of land force capabilities—to the JFC, staff, and boards.
- Single battle concept and focus of effort for land operations is an aspect of the plan rather than a function of coordination either horizontally or vertically.
- Synchronized/ integrated land force planning and execution—prioritization therefore deconfliction of competing land force requirements.
- Facilitates changes in disposition and battlefield geometry based on commander's read.

Disadvantages

- Additional staff.
- May create another layer of staff.
- Convolutates the role/function of the SCC if not properly demarcated by the JFC.
- Probable start-up orientation costs in crisis action planning and, to some lesser degree, in deliberate planning.

2. Under what circumstances would a JFLCC be formed vice establishing an OPCON/TACON relationship among land service components?

METT-T dependent. The size of multiservice forces, span of control, and proximity of forces within the area of operations dictates.

3. Under what circumstances might JFLCC headquarters responsibilities transfer from one service lead to another?

- Change in mission.
- Change in force composition.
- Result of combat actions.

4. What is the most likely circumstance for employing the JFLCC option?

Closely related objectives, geographically concentrated, that require the capabilities and functions of sizable forces from more than one service.

5. Given that the option will be employed, when must a JFLCC headquarters be established?

ASAP—ideally during planning before deployment.

6. What is the JFLCC's authority?

As prescribed by the JFC. UNAAF page IV-18 refers.

7. When would an established JFLCC headquarters be disbanded?

- Completion of mission that warranted establishment. JFLCC would probably work Phase V, posthostilities, but not redeployment.
- When the JFC no longer requires it.
- When a land force providing service departs.

8. Should the JFLCC be dual roled as a service component and a JFLCC headquarters or maintain a discrete command function?

Joint doctrine and other sources suggest that the norm is that a service component headquarters is designated as a functional component commander. However, there may be conditions that dictate a discrete headquarters may yield better results.

9. Is the JFLCC responsible only for planning, controlling and synchronizing direct combat forces or for all functions inherent in command of a land force to include sustaining, maintaining, and moving a force?

JFLCC authority and responsibilities should be dictated by the JFC; however, the administrative/sustainment aspects of land force operations remain aligned with the service component. The JFLCC provides planning guidance to the service component commanders and receives information from them that may have an impact on land force operations.

10. When and by what means are JFLCC authority and responsibility established by the JFC?

By OPORD/OPLAN, implementing directive, or warning order as soon as the JFC identifies the need for a JFLCC.

11. What factors are used in deciding who the JFLCC will be?

- METT-T.
- Preponderance of force.
- C4 capabilities.
- JFC desires.

12. What size and type headquarters are appropriate to base a JFLCC headquarters upon?

Corps/MEF or above.

13. For a multidivision sized land force drawn from the Army and Marines what is the estimate for number of personnel required for a JFLCC headquarters?

Personnel requirements will be predicated by the mission assigned and commensurate with the authority specified by the JFC. The CENTCOM DJFLCC SOP calls for the ARCENT staff to be augmented by 128 Marines if the ARFOR is to be the DJFLCC and in the other case 157 soldiers to augment the Marine staff.

14. What is the cost to the land service components in establishing a JFLCC headquarters?

- Personnel (cost of staff) and equipment.
- Increased distraction from the service role.
- Training time impact—the JFLCC staff must be trained.
- Possible impact on deployment.

15. What steps should be taken when forming the JFLCC staff?

- Conduct mission analysis.
- Match resources to functions.
- Make the staff joint.
- Conduct staff training.

16. What are the command relationships within a JFLCC?

The service component commanders provide forces and receive planning guidance from the JFLCC. Forces provided are OPCON or TACON.

17. What is the JFLCC role in crisis action planning?

The central figure for making recommendations as to the proper employment of land forces.

18. What products does the CJTF expect from the JFLCC?

- Synchronized, integrated, coordinated land operations.
- TPFDD input.
- Integrated prioritized target list.
- Refined enemy and friendly situations.

19. What is the JFLCC role in developing the TPFDD?

Advises the JFC on requirements and priorities.

20. When does the JFLCC assume control of ground forces?

Immediately for planning and when he has the requisite command and control capabilities in theater to command the forces assigned.

21. Does the JFLCC task capabilities or assign missions?

Almost always assigns missions.

22. Does the JFLCC or do the components submit the component targeting lists?

The JFLCC submits a consolidated and prioritized land force target list to the JFC. This does not preclude the SCCs from submitting their own based on requirements found in their battlespace.

23. When a JFLCC is established, do excess MAGTF sorties go first to the JFLCC for allocation and any remaining to the JFACC or do they all go to the JFACC regardless?

Established joint doctrine says that MAGTF excess sorties will be made available to the JFC for tasking by the JFACC.

24. Does the JFLCC sit on the JTCCB? Do the components?

Both the JFLCC and the SCCs sit on the JTCCB.

25. Does JFLCC provide a BCD to the JFACC?

The BCD concept is a good idea and the JFLCC should provide one—whether the JFLCC builds one or uses the ARFOR is academic. The ARFOR BCD generally loses its coordination authority once a JFLCC begins presenting the land force perspective to the AOC. Additionally, the JFACC should send a robust liaison team to the JFLCC.

26. How is logistics performed if you have a JFLCC?

Through service component commanders.

27. Who controls ATACMS, JFLCC or ARFOR?

As specified by the JFLCC.

28. What JFLCC procedures are needed?

JFC implementing instructions, SOPs, and billet descriptions.

29. What should Joint Publication 3-56 say about JFLCC?

That it is an option—no more than is necessary to guide the JFC and potential JFLCC in establishment of the functional commander. Keep it at the doctrinal level and avoid prescriptive TTP.

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Glossary

ALSA	Air Land Sea Application
AMCI	Army Marine Corps Integration
ARCENT	Army Forces Central Command
ARFOR	Army Forces
ASAP	as soon as possible
ASCC	Army service component commander
BCD	battlefield coordination detachment
C2	command and control
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
capt	captain
CBT	combat
CFLCC	Combined Forces Land Component Commander
CG	Commanding General
CINC	commander of a combatant command; commander in chief
CINCCENT	
CINCNELM	Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CJTF	Commander, Joint Task Force
col	colonel
COCOM	combatant commander
COMAMLANFOR	Commander, Army Marine Land Forces
COMUSARCENT	Commander United States Army Forces, Central Command
COMUSMACV	Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam
DJFLCC	Deputy Joint Force Land Component Commander
DJFLCC HQ SOP	Deputy Joint Force Land Component Commander Headquarters Standing Operating Procedures
FM	field manual
FSCL	fire support coordination line
FWD	forward
G-1	Army or Marine Corps component manpower of personnel staff officer
G-2	Army or Marine Corps component intelligence staff officer
G-3	Army or Marine Corps component operations staff officer
G-4	Army or Marine Corps component logistics staff officer
G-5	Army or Marine Corps component plans staff officer
G-6	Army or Marine Corps command, control, communications, and computer systems staff officer
HQ	Headquarters
HQ TRADOC	Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command
intel	intelligence
J-1	Manpower and Personnel Directorate
J-2	Intelligence Directorate
J-3	Operations Directorate
J-4	Logistics Directorate

J-5	Plans Directorate
J-6	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate
JAAN	Joint Actions of the Army and Navy
JASC	Joint Actions Steering Committee
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC	Joint Force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	Joint force land component commander
JFMCC	Joint Force Marine component commander
Joint Pub	Joint Publication
JTCB	Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF	joint task force
JTFHQMTG	joint task force headquarters masters training guide
LCC	land component commander
LNO	liaison officer
LTC	lieutenant colonel
LTG	lieutenant general
maj	major
maj gen	maj general
MARCENT	Marine Forces Central Command
MARFOR	Marine Corps forces
MCCDC	Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCM	Multicommand Manual
MCRP	Marine Corps Reference Publication
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
MEF (FWD)	Marine expeditionary force (forward)
METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MTG	Master Training Guide
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
ops	operations
OPSEC	operations security
PROVCORPSV	Provisional Corps, Vietnam
PSYOP	psychological operations
SCC	service component commander
SOP	standing operating procedures
TACON	tactical control
TF 51	Task Force 51
TF 56	Task Force 56
TMD	theater missile defense
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
U	university
UE	UNIFIED ENDEAVOR
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
US	United States

USA	United States Army
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USARCENT	United States Army Central Command
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II
4th BCT	4th Brigade Combat Team
I CTZ	I Corps Tactical Zone
I MEF	I Marine Expeditionary Force
II MEF	II Marine Expeditionary Force
II MEF (FWD)	II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)
III MAF	III Marine Amphibious Force